Journal of Global Economics, Public Policy and Development

Vol. 1 (2026)
Articles

Acting-in-Concert Shareholders in Emerging Economies: A Systematic Review on Governance, Investor Protection, and Public Policy

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  • Shanshan Yue,
  • Xue Lei,
  • Khartic Rao Manokaran
Shanshan Yue
School of Public Finance and Taxation, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450046, Henan, China; Department of Financial Intelligence, University of South Africa, Muckleneuk 0002, Pretoria, South Africa
Xue Lei
School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China
Khartic Rao Manokaran
Newcastle Business School, Newcastle Australia Institute of Higher Education, 188064, Singapore

Published 2026-08-05

Keywords

  • Corporate governance,
  • Investor protection,
  • Public policy,
  • Ownership concentration,
  • Shareholder activism,
  • Emerging economies
    • ...More
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Abstract

Acting-in-concert arrangements allow shareholders to coordinate voting, control, and engagement, but in emerging economies they may strengthen oversight or enable private-benefit extraction. This study systematically reviews how such arrangements affect governance, investor protection, market efficiency, and public policy. Following PRISMA, Scopus and Web of Science were searched for peer-reviewed studies published during 2015–2024; 41 articles met the eligibility criteria and an adapted QualSyst quality threshold. Descriptive, age-normalized citation, keyword, and thematic analyses identify a geographically concentrated literature led by China, Malaysia, and Brazil. To limit conceptual overlap, the synthesis distinguishes ownership structure as an antecedent, shareholder activism as a coordination process, majority–minority conflict as a distributional outcome, and M&A and competition as transactional and market outcomes. Coordinated action enhances governance when coalitions are disclosed, independent monitoring is credible, and minority rights are enforceable; it erodes governance when opaque alliances, concentrated control, and weak enforcement enable tunneling, connected transactions, and expropriation. These mechanisms are not automatically generalizable across emerging economies because family, state, and institutional ownership interact differently with legal enforcement. The review prioritizes testable research on institutional contingencies, coalition transparency, transaction safeguards, and explainable network-based detection. It recommends regime-specific policy: safe harbors for transparent engagement in stronger systems, enhanced beneficial-ownership and related-party controls under concentrated ownership, and supervisory network analytics with human review where enforcement capacity is weak. These findings connect shareholder coordination to more transparent and resilient capital-market development.

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